Aristotle's Concept of Mind

In this book, Erick Raphael Jiménez examines Aristotle's concept of mind (nous), a key concept in Aristotelian psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. Drawing on a close analysis of De Anima, Jiménez argues that mind is neither disembodied nor innate, as has commonly been held, but an embodied ability that emerges from learning and discovery. Looking to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez argues that just as Aristotelian mind is not innate, intelligibility is not an innate feature of the objects of Aristotelian mind, but an outcome of certain mental constructions that make those objects intelligible. Conversely, it is through these same mental constructions that thinkers become intelligent, or come to possess minds. Connecting this account to Aristotle's metaphysics and epistemology, Jiménez shows how this concept of mind fits within Aristotle's wider philosophy. His bold interpretation will interest a wide range of readers in ancient and later philosophy.

Acknowledgements; Introduction; Part I. Preliminaries to Aristotle's Concept of Mind: 1. A dialectical argument in DA III.4; 2. The model of explanation in Aristotelian psychology; 3. Mind in body: Aristotelian arguments for embodiment; Part II. The Activity of Aristotelian Mind: 4. Making things intelligible: a commentary on DA III.5; Part III. The Objects of Aristotelian Mind: 5. Aristotelian essences: a commentary on Met. VII.4-12; 6. Aristotelian principles: a commentary on APo II.19; Part IV. Aristotle on Thinking: The Time-Perception Model of Thinking: 7. Aristotle's concept of time: a commentary on Phys. IV.10-4; 8. The role of time in Aristotle's account of perception; 9. Mind and time in Aristotle's account of meaning; Epilogue; Works cited.

Erick Raphael Jiménez is Lecturer in Philosophy at California State University, Northridge.