Antitrust Policy versus Economic Power, Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1975

The gradual economic integration of Western Europe is bringing about far­ reaching changes in the countries taking part in the venture. One of the features of this process - and a prominent feature - is making itself felt in the field of industrial organization through a profound change in the structure of a large number of markets. In taking advantage of the larger market created by the elimination of national frontiers as barriers to trade, large firms playa leading role - firms from within the European Community and from outside. The merger device has been a major vehicle of expansion, and in several sectors of manufacturing industry this has already led to an in­ crease in the relative importance of a few firms. Over the years, public opinion has become increasingly aware of the con­ centration of industrial power and of itG attendant problems. Merger law and control of the operations of la:;e corporations are current topics of discussion. More especially, merger statutes have recently been enacted in Britain and Germany, and the matter is coming to be one of the chief pre­ occupations of the European Commission.

1 Industrial Concentration and Economic Power.- 1 Industrial Concentration and Competition: An Appraisal.- 2 Factors Determining Concentration.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 Economic Determinants of Corporate Growth.- 2.2.1 Factors Determining Plant Size.- 2.2.2 Factors Determining Firm Size.- 3 An Assessment of Concentration.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 Criteria for Market Determination.- 3.2.1 The Product Dimension.- 3.2.2 The Geographic Dimension.- 3.2.3 Summary and Conclusions.- 3.3 Methods of Detecting Market Power.- 3.3.1 Introduction.- 3.3.2 Indicia of Market Power: The Competitive Environment.- 3.3.3 Indicia of Market Power: Behavior and Performance Standards.- 3.3.3.1 Corporate Behavior as Indicium of Market Power.- 3.3.3.2 Microeconomic Performance Standards.- 3.3.3.3 Macroeconomic Performance Standards.- 3.3.4 Summary and Conclusions.- 3.4 The Assessment of Mergers.- 3.4.1 Introduction.- 3.4.2 Horizontal Mergers.- 3.4.3 Vertical Mergers.- 3.4.4 Conglomerate Mergers.- 3.4.5 Joint Ventures.- 3.4.6 Summary and Conclusions.- 2 The Antitrust Laws Applied to Combination.- 4 The Law on Monopolies.- 4.1 Basic Ideas and Intent of the Antitrust Laws.- 4.1.1 The Common Law on Contracts in Restraint of Trade and Monopolies.- 4.1.2 Antitrust Measures Prior to the Sherman Act.- 4.1.3 Design and Content of the Sherman Act.- 4.1.4 Other Antitrust Laws. Enforcement Agencies. Exemptions.- 4.1.5 Summary and Conclusions.- 4.2 The Case Law on Monopolies.- 4.2.1 Content and Meaning of the Rule of Reason.- 4.2.2 The Law Applied to Trusts.- 4.2.3 The Case Law on Monopolies since 1945.- 4.2.4 The Case Law on Vertical Integration.- 4.2.5 Summary of the Law on Monopolies.- 4.2.6 A Critique of the Case Law.- 4.3 The Case Law on Oligopolies.- 4.3.1 Oligopoly Situations under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.- 4.3.2 Oligopoly Situations under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.- 4.3.3 A Critique of the Case Law.- 5 The Law on Mergers.- 5.1 Merger Case Law under the Sherman Act.- 5.2 The Content of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.- 5.2.1 The Clayton Act of 1914.- 5.2.2 An Analysis of the Cases between 1914 and 1950.- 5.2.2.1 The Substantiality Test of Section 7.- 5.2.2.2 The Remedies under Section 7.- 5.2.2.3 The Applicability of Section 5 of the FTC Act.- 5.2.3 The 1950 Amendment (The Celler-Kefauver Act).- 5.2.3.1 Origins.- 5.2.3.2 An Analysis of the Text.- 5.2.3.3 The Scope of Section 7.- 5.2.3.4 Enforcement Agencies. Remedies.- 5.3 Interpretation of the Clayton Act (1): The Relevant Market.- 5.3.1 Introduction.- 5.3.2 Determination of the Product Market.- 5.3.3 Determination of the Geographic Market.- 5.3.4 Summary of the Case Law on Determination of the Relevant Market.- 5.4 Interpretation of the Clayton Act (2): The Substantiality Test.- 5.4.1 Horizontal and Vertical Mergers.- 5.4.1.1 The du Pont (General Motors) Decision.- 5.4.1.2 Lower Court and FTC Decisions before Brown Shoe.- 5.4.1.3 The Brown Shoe Decision.- 5.4.1.4 Supreme Court Decisions after Brown Shoe.- 5.4.1.5 Lower Court and FTC Decisions after Brown Shoe.- 5.4.1.6 Decisions in Private Injunctive Suits.- 5.4.2 Conglomerate Mergers.- 5.4.3 Joint Ventures.- 5.4.4 Mergers with Failing Companies.- 5.4.5 Remedies.- 5.5 A Summary of the Case Law.- 5.6 A Critique of the Case Law.- 3 The Limitations of Antitrust in Restraining Concentration.- 6 An Appraisal of the Impact of Antitrust.- 6.1 The Influence of Antitrust on the Pattern of Competition.- 6.1.1 The Impact of Government Action.- 6.1.2 The Prophylactic Influence of Antitrust Policy.- 6.1.3 Summary and Conclusions.- 6.2 Antitrust Judged by Its Objectives.- 6.3 Further Aspects of Competition on Concentrated Markets.- 7 Standards for a Policy toward Concentration.- 7.1 Market Power: The Limitations of Antitrust.- 7.1.1 The Notion of Market Power and the Law.- 7.1.2 The Enforceability of Direct Restraints on Market Power.- 7.1.3 The Enforceability of Restraints on Conduct.- 7.1.4 Conglomerate Power and the Antitrust Laws.- 7.2 Market Power: The Limitations of Instruments other Than Antitrust.- 7.3 The Limitations of Merger Policy.- 7.4 Competition Policy in Europe: The Present Position and Future Prospects.- 7.5 Summary and Conclusions.- Table of Cases.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.