Applied industrial economics (paper)

A collection of papers published over the last ten years in American and European journals, separated into sections dealing with market structure and size, the role of pricing schemes in oligopolistic markets and providing a game-theoretic foundation to competition and policy and merger control.

Part I. Market Structure: 1. Game theory and industry studies: an introductory overview J. Sutton, 2. Game-theoretic models of market concentration: sunk costs and market structure - a review article R. Schmalensee, 3. Expanding markets: capacity expansion in titanium dioxide P. Ghemawat, 4. Declining markets: the devolution of declining industries P. Ghemawat and B. Nalebuff, 5. Empirical evidence: exit from declining industries - ‘shakeout' or ‘stakeout' M. B. Lieberman, Part II. Industrial Pricing and Pricing Schemes: 6. Inter-temporal pricing schemes: experimental tests of consciously parallel behaviour in oligopoly R. Harstard, S. Martin and H.-T. Normann, 7. Spatial pricing schemes: on the strategic choice of spatial price policy J.-F. Thisse and X. Vives, 8. Best-price policies: facilitating practices - the effects of advance notice and best-price policies C. A. Holt and D. T. Scheffman, 9. Vertical pricing schemes: vertical restraints and producers' competition P. Rey and J. Stiglitz, 10. Price discrimination in a common market: international price discrimination in the European car market F. Verboven, 11. Tacit collusion: inter-firm rivalry in a repeated game - an empirical test of tacit collusion M. E. Slade, 12. Tacit collusion: collusive equilibrium in the great salt duopoly R. Rees, Part III. Competition Policy: 13. Collusion and predation: on the detection of collusion and predation L. Philips, 14. Vertical restraints: vertical restraints in European competition policy J. A. Kay, 15. Franchising agreements: economic assessment of competition law provisions applicable to franchising The OECD 16. Joint R and D ventures: cooperative and noncooperative R and D in duopoly in spillovers C. d'Aspremont and A. Jacquemin, Part IV. Mergers and Merger Control: 17. Unprofitable exogenous mergers: losses from horizontal merger - the effects of exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium S. W. Salmant, S. Switzer, and R. J. Reynolds, 18. Profitable horizontal mergers and welfare: horizontal mergers - an equilibrium analysis J. Farrell and C. Shapiro, 19. Using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index: horizontal mergers - comment G. J. Werden, 20. Cournot and merger control: horizontal mergers - reply J. Farrell and C. Shapiro, 21.Vertical mergers: vertical mergers in multi-product industries and Edgeworth's paradox of taxation M. A. Salinger, 22. Enforcement of the US merger guidelines: empirical evidence on FTC enforcement of the merger guidelines M. B. Coate and F. S. McChesney, 23. Enforcement of the European merger regulation: the merger decisions of the European Commission D. Neven, R. Nuttall and P. Seabright.