An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics, 1st ed. 2019

1:         Introduction

1.1:      The Concepts of Personhood in African Philosophy

1.2:      Developments in the Literature on Personhood

1.3:      Themes and Structure of the Book

 

2:         A Conceptual Mapping of Personhood

2.1:      Introduction

2.2:      Menkiti's Analysis of Personhood

2.3:      Gyekye on Personhood

2.4:      Matolino, Kaphagawani, and Ikuenobe on Personhood

2.5:      Conclusion

 

3:         An Exposition of Personhood as Moral Theory

3,1:      Introduction

3.2:      Being Human and Being a Person

3.3:      Personhood Embodies a Character-Based Ethics

3.4:      Means and Ends in Personhood

3.5:      Humanism and the Instrumentality of Relationships

3.6:      Rejection of Social Relationships as the Moral End

3.7:      The Role of Relationships in Personhood

3.8:      Conclusion

 

4:         Personhood: Partiality or Impartiality

4.1:      Introduction

4.2:      Contextualising the debate Partiality and Impartiality in Moral Philosophy

4.3:      Personhood: Partiality or Impartiality?

4.4:      Conclusion

 

5:         Personhood and Options in African Moral Thought

5.1:      Introduction

5.2:      Wiredu’s Approach to Moral Philosophy

5.3:      Tshivhase’s Criticism of Personhood

5.4:      Conclusion

 

6:         Personhood and Dignity in African Philosophy

6.1:      Introduction

6.2:      Ikuenobe’s Conception of Dignity

6.3:      Personhood and Dignity

6.4:      Personhood, Partiality and Dignity

6.5:      The Young and the Marginal Cases, and Dignity

6.6:      Conclusion

 

7:         Personhood as a Political Theory of Duties

7.1:      Introduction

7.2:      The Idea of Rights

7.3:      Menkiti and Two Conceptions of Personhood

7.4:      The Minimalist Conception of Personhood and Rights

7.5:      The Maximalist Conception of Personhood and Duties

7.6:      Conclusion