Bargaining over the Bomb The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations

Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.

Introduction; 1. How are nuclear weapons special? 2. The theory of butter-for-bombs agreements: how potential power coerces concessions; 3. Does nuclear proficiency induce compliance? 4. The diplomacy of butter-for-bombs agreements; 5. Arms treaties and the changing credibility of preventive war; 6. You get what you give: endogenous nuclear reversal; 7. Preventive strikes: when states call the wrong 'bluff'; 8. Lessons learned.

William Spaniel is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He previously served as a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is also the author of Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook (2011).