Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements Series

How we engage in epistemic practice, including our methods of knowledge acquisition and transmission, the personal traits that help or hinder these activities, and the social institutions that facilitate or impede them, is of central importance to our lives as individuals and as participants in social and political activities. Traditionally, Anglophone epistemology has tended to neglect the various ways in which these practices go wrong, and the epistemic, moral, and political harms and wrongs that follow. In the past decade, however, there has been a turn towards the non-ideal in epistemology. Articles in this volume focus on topics including intellectual vices, epistemic injustices, interpersonal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. In addition to exploring the various ways in which epistemic practices go wrong at the level of both individual agents and social structures, the papers gathered herein discuss how these problems are related, and how they may be addressed.

1. Harms and wrongs in epistemic practice Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar and Trystan S. Goetze; 2. Can closed-mindedness be an intellectual virtue? Heather Battaly; 3. Caring for esteem and intellectual reputation: some epistemic benefits and harms Alessandra Tanesini; 4. Understanding epistemic trust injustices and their harms Heidi Grasswick; 5. On anger, silence, and epistemic injustice Alison Bailey; 6. Just say 'no!': obligations to voice disagreement Casey Rebecca Johnson; 7. On empathy and testimonial trust Olivia Bailey; 8. Ambivalence about forgiveness Miranda Fricker; 9. The epistemology of terrorism and radicalisation Quassim Cassam; 10. Healthcare practice, epistemic injustice, and naturalism Ian James Kidd and Havi Carel; 11. What is epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorising? Keith Harris.