Varieties of Things
Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics

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Language: English

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Varieties of things: foundations of contemporary metaphysics
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290 p. · 15.5x22.9 cm · Paperback

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Varieties of things: foundations of contemporary metaphysics
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292 p. · 10x25 cm · Hardback

Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics is about some of the most fundamental kinds of things that there are; the things that we encounter in everyday experience.

  • A book about the things that we encounter in everyday experience.
  • Contains a thorough and accessible discussion of the nature and aims of metaphysics.
  • Examines a wide range of ontological categories, including both particulars and universals.
  • Mounts a forceful and persuasive case for anti-reductionism.

Preface vii

Part I: Metaphysics and Its Tools

1 The Nature and Function of Metaphysics 3

The Methodology and Subject Matter of Metaphysics 4

Aristotle’s Conception of Metaphysics 8

Kant’s Conception of Metaphysics 11

A Working Conception of Metaphysics 14

2 Some Tools of Metaphysics 36

Criteria of Ontological Commitment: Two Examples 36

‘No Entity without Identity’: Identity Conditions for Objects 56

Individuation Conditions, Identity Conditions, and Metaphysical Kinds 59

Principles and Criteria of Identity 63

Part II: Particulars

3 Material Substances 79

Our Ontological Commitment to Material Substances 79

The Bundle Theory and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles 81

Problems with the Bundle Theory 84

The Bare Substratum Theory and the Principle of Acquaintance 110

Objections to the Bare Substratum Theory 113

An Alternative 114

4 Persons and Personal Identity 135

Our Ontological Commitment to Persons 135

Candidates for Persistence Conditions for Persons 138

The Closest Continuer Theory and Its Problems 150

Does the Concept of Identity Apply to Persons? 155

The Multiple Occupancy Thesis 162

Back to Basics: Continuity and Fission 164

A Suggestion 169

5 Events 181

Our Ontological Commitment to Events 183

Three Criteria: Spatio-temporal Coincidence, Necessary Spatio-temporal Coincidence, and Sameness of Cause and Effect 186

The Property Exemplification Account of Events (PEE) 193

Part III: Universals

6 Universals and the Realism/Nominalism Dispute 219

The Issue 223

Varieties of Nominalism 225

Two Conceptions of Universals 236

The Regress Charge and Two Unsuccessful Attempts to Meet It 239

An Alternative 245

Bibliography 260

Index 272

Cynthia Macdonald is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. She is Associate Editor of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy and the author or editor of numerous publications, including The Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation (co-edited with Graham Macdonald, Blackwell, 1994), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation (co-edited with Graham Macdonald, Blackwell, 1995) and Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics (co-edited with Stephen Laurence, Blackwell, 1998).